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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY YEAR
( 1
Volume 2 Chicago • Illinois Number 2
Accounting in the Law Schools
WILBER G. KATZ
James Parker Hall Professor of Law
In 1930 the first course in accounting at any law school
was offered by Professor Wi.llard J. Graham at the Uni­
versity of Chicago. The course was developed after a
survey of the opinions of several hundred lawyers as
to the importance of accounting in their law practice.
When I came to the School, Mr. Graham invited me to
join him in writing Accounting in Law Practice, which
was the first book on accounting written especially for
lawyers.
In 1952 the lawyer's need for knowledge of accounting
is everywhere admitted. Accounting is a favorite sub­
ject for Bar Association institutes and courses for prac­
ticing lawyers. In the last two years three accounting
books for lawyers have been published-books by Oehler,
Shannon, and Shugerman. College study of accounting
is generally considered as an important part of prelegal
education. Courses in accounting have been introduced
in many of the strongest law schools, and two collections
of cases and other teaching materials are now available
for such courses. In the Harvard Law School curriculum
accounting has been made a required subject. At the
University of Chicago the course is elected by most of the
students.
With an increasing number of legal subjects to be
crowded into a three-year program, how can addition of
instruction in accounting be defended? If familiarity
with accounting is necessary for study of fields like
taxation and corporation law, why not merely require
college study in the field before admission to law school?
One difficulty is with the type of material covered in
elementary accounting courses in most colleges and
undergraduate schools of business. Much time is devoted
to bookkeeping procedures and subjects which are of
little concern to the lawyer. Many of the topics most
important for the lawyer's work are dealt with only in
advanced courses.
Few prelegal students are able to fit into their pro­
gram of general education enough study of accounting
to reach the level needed in the study of law. Further­
more, rigid prelegal course re­
quirements have never been an
effective way of assuring uniform
preparation of law students.
With reference to accounting,
therefore, the trend is to include
a brief . but concentrated intro­
duction in the law school pro­
gram. Students preparing for a
law school with such a program
may therefore devote their col-
lege years to more basic liberal W£lber G. Katz
arts preparation.
Some of the courses and books have been given the
title "Legal Accounting." This phrase suggests that there
is a particular kind or branch of accounting with which
lawyers are concerned. What the lawyer needs, how­
ever, is a critical understanding of general accounting
theory. A course or text designed for law students or
lawyers is suitable also for others who need an intro­
duction to accounting rather than training for account­
ancy. Thus at the University of Chicago in World War
II� law students and graduate students in economics
were grouped together for their study of accounting.
The course at The Law School now covers approxi­
mately 33 class hours. In this period it is possible to
cover the material most essential for law study and to
prepare students for further study of accounting prob­
lems "on their own" and for effective consultation with
professional accountants. The pace of instruction has to
be rapid, and ways must be found to exorcise the fear
of figures which seems always to turn up in about one­
third of the class.
We begin by studying the two basic financial state­
ments, the income statement and the balance sheet, and
the relation between these statements. The "double-entry"
technique can be taught in a very short time, and
with very little "paper work," if the procedures are con­
stantly related to the resulting financial, statements.
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The accounting concept of income is next studied, and
the determination of periodic income as a process of
matching items of revenue and expense through the
techniques of accrual and deferment. In recent years great
strides have been taken by accounting associations in
rationalizing and standardizing accounting procedures.
Research bulletins of the American Institute of Account­
ants (an organization principally of practicing account­
ants) furnish excellent teaching materials on a number
of topics. The same is true of some of the formulations
of accounting standards developed by the American
Accounting Association, the organization of teachers
of accounting. The accounting profession has reached
the stage of group "restatement" of its principles.
Problems of inventory valuation are considered in
some detail, including the controversy over "last-in-first­
out" and "first-in-first-out." Considerable time is also de­
voted to problems of depreciation, including the current
controversy over the effect of recent price-level changes
and the problem of financing replacements. In this con­
nection attention is given to the recommendations of
the "Study Group on Business Income," a group of
accountants, lawyers, and economists who wrestled with
the problem for several years. Professor Blum has re­
viewed their report in the January issue of the Tax Law
Review.
In dealing with such problems, students come to under­
stand that choice among alternatives is made primarily
with a view to a meaningful income statement. Decisions
thus made also govern the showing of related items on
the balance sheet, but determination of balance-sheet
"values" is not the primary objective.
It is often necessary to contrast the general accounting
concept of income with the concept of taxable net in­
come. This is difficult with students who have not yet
studied income taxation and who thus know little of
the considerations which account for the divergencies,
considerations of administrative convenience, and security
in the collection of taxes.
The various classes of reserves are studied in some
detail. These items are among the most confusing to the
uninitiated reader of financial statements and are items
which often feature in litigation. After learning how
to distinguish the very diverse types of reserves, students
are not surprised to learn that accounting societies are
advocating the abandonment of the confusing term
" "
reserve.
One of the important areas of controversy in account­
ing circles deals with the practice of by-passing the
income statement by charging or crediting various un­
usual items of gain or loss directly to the earned surplus
or retained income account. Here is a matter of great
importance for lawyers, because of its bearing on the
application of provisions in contracts, corporate charters,
and other documents which require determination of
the "income" or "profits" or "earnings" of a period. This
is the type of controversial topic to which college teach-
ers of accounting often give little attention in elementary
courses. In one recent intermediate text it is said: "Until
the issue is more dearly resolved, an instructor is thor­
oughly justified in suggesting the adoption of either
point of view, if for no other reason than to achieve
class uniformity." Imagine a law-school instructor try­
ing to make "class uniformity" his objective in dealing
with problems on which the law is not yet settled!
One topic which is often deferred to advanced courses
is that of consolidated statements. Corporation lawyers
are constantly dealing with such statements and should
know what they purport to show and something of
the procedures by which they are prepared. By use of
simplified materials it is possible in two or three class
hours to make students familiar with some of the most
troublesome points, such as the elimination of inter­
company profits, debts, and stock holdings and the treat­
ment of divergence between the cost of the parent's hold­
ings of stock in the subsidiaries and the book value of
these holdings on the books of the subsidiaries.
Increasing use of partnership forms of business organi­
zation has given partnership accounting a new import­
ance for the lawyer. Tax considerations often motivate
the selection of the partnership form, and these considera­
tions, in turn, are often tied up with accounting treat­
ment of items such as admission and retirement of part­
ners, adjustments for partners' "salaries," and distribu­
tion of partnership assets in kind.
Lawyers need also some introduction to the use of
accumulation and discount tables for annuities and single
sums. Such calculations are involved in amortization
loan transactions, in various types of business valuations
based upon earnings projections, in inheritance tax
valuation of life-estates and remainders, and in many
other situations. Understanding of these calculations also
facilitates understanding of problems of bond discount
and premium and their amortization and the treatment
of unamortized balances upon redemption or refunding.
One subject which can be given only passing reference
in a brief course is that of cost accounting. It is not
that this specialty is unimportant for the lawyer. Cases
under the Robinson-Patman Act often turn on cost
comparisons as justifying price discrimination, and "re­
negotiation" of profits under government contracts usual­
ly requires complicated study of contract costs. Cost ac­
counting techniques are of great intricacy, however, and
little more can be done in an introductory course than
to indicate their importance and their relation to the
valuation of inventories of a manufacturing business.
Renegotiation cases have also required of lawyers an
understanding of the techniques of ratio analysis of
financial statements and of the use of comparative state­
ments for a series of years. The significance of principal
balance-sheet and income-statement ratios can be present­
ed with a few illustrations, and students can be thus
prepared to pursue the subject further in the specialized
books on statement analysis.
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It is important to develop not only the usefulness of
the two basic statements but also their limitations. One
of the most important limitations is in relation to study
of adequacy of working capital. Material contained in
balance sheets and income statements is not arranged
so as to facilitate its use for this purpose. In corporate
annual reports these statements are often supplemented
by a statement of flow of funds. Study of such state­
ments is desirable for a number of reasons including the
light thus thrown on the relation between periodic ac­
counting for depreciation (amortization of cost) and
the provision of funds for replacements.
Security prospectuses and annual reports to share­
holders are used as stimulating and realistic material for
presenting many of the topics covered. Students are in­
troduced to SEC Regulation S-X, the general regulation
governing statements filed with the Commission, and to
the accounting series of releases.
A number of important areas of accounting are left
untouched because they are better studied in the law
courses themselves. This is true of accounting for issu­
ance and reacquisition of shares, for dividend distribu­
tion, and for formal reduction of capital stock and so­
called "quasi-reorganization." The same is true of the
peculiarities of public utility accounting and of account­
ing in relation to segregating principal and income when
property is held in trust.
As already suggested, the lawyer requires a critical
approach to accounting concepts. As an illustration of
such an approach, the readings include an imaginative
and witty article by Walton Hamilton on the limits of
accounting concepts and techniques. To test student
understanding of the article, I like to raise the question
as to whether Hamilton's attitude is one of hostile de­
bunking. Last year a student immediately answered
that such a characterization would be quite unfair­
that Hamilton merely applies to accounting concepts
the approach familiar to our students from their study
of Dean Levi's Introduction to Legal Reasoning.
Experience has suggested that a few students have to
be warned against expecting too much from their knowl­
edge of accounting. They need to be reminded that legal
questions concerning income usually involve questions
of interpretation which accounting principles, however
well settled, do not foreclose. Thus if it should become
recognized that as a matter of accounting depreciation
expense should be increased to take account of infla­
tionary change in purchasing power, the resulting con­
cept of income would not necessarily be applicable under
an income bond indenture. To apply such a concept of
income would give shareholders a protection from the
impact of inflation at the expense of bondholders whose
maximum return is not adjusted in relation to decreased
purchasing power. In learning something of accounting
analysis, law students must remember to think like law­
yers.
Book Reviews-Home and Abroad
We bring to the attention of the alumni two recent re­
views of books published by members of The Law School
Faculty. The first, a review of Allison Dunham's Modern
Real Estate Transactions: Cases and Materials, appeared
in the October, 1952, issue of the American Bar Associa­
tion Journal. The second edition of Edward H. Levi's
An Introduction to Legal Reasoning was reviewed in the
April, 1952, edition of The Law Quarterly Review, pub­
lished in England. Both reviews follow in their entirety.
Modern Real Estate Transactions: Cases and Materials.
By ALLISON DUNHAM. Brooklyn: Foundation Press,
Inc., 1952! Pp. 1029. $8.50.
Concerning this book, the author, a professor of law
at the University of Chicago, says that its objective "is
to bring together for teaching purposes the legal con­
cepts and institutions of the marketing of land"; that
"it is organized on the basis of problems in house market­
ing." House-building problems are not dealt with. Start­
ing with the raw material, namely, the land on which
the housing structure is finally to stand, the problems of
processing the land for its intended use-zoning and
other restrictions imposed by public authority-are first
considered. Next come controls imposed by private agree­
ment-easements, equitable servitudes and covenants
running with the land. Here are considered problems
of basic policy as to what restrictions and covenants may
be enforced, such as restraints on alienation, racial re­
strictions.
Problems in house marketing
occupy some two-thirds of the
book. This is as it should be,
since few of the students who
use this book will ever represent
subdividers or wholesale build­
ers, but all of them will have to
do with problems affecting the
sale or leasing of housing struc­
tures. This practical approach is
typical. The student will find
nothing here about the the Stat- Allison Dun/lam
ute of Uses, or De Donis, or
Quia Emptores. He will find something about the
Statute of Frauds, for that is an element entering into
almost every transaction affecting real property.
In a review of reasonable length, it is possible only
to mention some of the house marketing problems dealt
with. They cover a field of an extent which will surprise
the lawyer who has dealt with such matters piecemeal
as they arise in practice. To enumerate a few: Who
participates in these transactions-buyer, seller, broker,
mortgagee, escrow agent, attorneys for any or all of these
-and the laws or customs affecting their participation;
documents and papers; when title passes; what consti­
tutes performance; remedies of the parties; title prob-
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lems and methods of title assurance. The concluding
chapter deals with transfers of undivided interests.
Throughout the work is valuable material on the
historical, economic and social aspects of house market­
ing and the preparation of land for residential purposes.
As the author is careful to point out in his preface, he
espouses no theory. He is a careful and industrious ex­
positor who has presented a well-organized work in
which is drawn together from varied sources, not all of
them by any means what we commonly term "legal,"
a vast collection of material dealing with an important
field of the law.
The author calls his work a "coursebook." The term
suggests casebook, plus something more, giving a promise
which the work fulfils. It is in fact a source book, and
it has characteristics which we commonly associate with
well-written textbooks. For that reason, I have no hesi­
tancy in recommending it to practitioners, as well as to
the students for whose needs it was evidently primarily
prepared. The opinions, about one hundred, which, scat­
tered throughout, are given in full, do not occupy a dis­
proportionate part of the 1029 pages. The number of addi­
tional cases cited or quoted from cannot be readily de­
termined, since not all of them are referred to in the
table of cases, but the number is large. A detailed table
of contents is supplemented by an index.
WALTER L. NossAMAN
An Introduction to Legal Reasoning. By EDWARD H. LEVI.
Second Impression. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press; London: Cambridge University Press. 1950. Pp.
iv + 74. $2.00.
This book marks an important advance in "realist"
jurisprudence. Professor Levi holds with Jerome Frank
that it is mere "folklore" to regard law as "a system of
known rules applied by a judge" and legal reasoning as
consisting in the subsumption of a new case under a
given fixed rule. But for him this overthrow of our
traditional jurisprudence does not annihilate all j uris­
prudence; it does not reduce the legal process to mere
guesswork or a calculation of the psychological or diges­
tive factors operating within the individual judge. The
legal process is still a process of reasoning and legal con­
cepts and rules are still the tools with which it works.
Legal reasoning, however, "has a logic of its own." "The
kind of reasoning involved in the legal process is one
in which the classification changes as the classification is
made." Nevertheless this kind of reasoning can be an
object of study and, indeed, "the law forum is the most
explicit demonstration of the mechanism required for
a moving classification system."
Legal reasoning is reasoning by example or analogy.
Competing examples, for instance, previous decisions,
are presented to the court and the court chooses which
it will apply. Its choice is ultimately a reflection of the
ideas generally prevailing in the time and place to which
it belongs, but its decision is not necessarily expressed
directly in terms of these ideas. The legal process em­
ploys a mechanism of rules, concepts and classifications.
Each new decision by adding something reshapes the
rule, and the classifications thus change from case to
case. Yet in their changes a general law of growth and
decline can be traced. Professor Levi illustrates his mean­
ing by three brilliant historical studies of case-law, statu­
tory interpretation and constitutional interpretation. In
the first stage (we take only his account of case-law,
illustrated from the cases concerning dangerous chattels)
a succession of courts fumbles its way towards a classifica­
tory concept which will help in the practical task of deci­
sion. In the second stage, having found what seems a
practically useful concept, for instance, that of "inherent­
ly dangerous things," the courts proceed to apply it in
a line of cases, filling up its categories with particular in­
stances, until the dangerous list comprises "a loaded gun,
possibly a defective gun, mislabelled poison, defective
hairwash, scaffolds, a defective coffee urn and a defective
aerated bottle," while the nondangerous list includes "a
defective carriage, a bursting lamp, a defective balance
wheel for a circular saw and a defective boiler." Then
in the last stage of the process the courts, feeling (as in
the judgments in MacPherson v. Buick) that their
classification is getting out of touch with social life, or
rather that social life is getting out of touch with their
classification, begin to cast about for a higher or wider
principle or rule, and, as they do so, the concept which
hitherto has served them gradually falls into disuse. But
a broad formulation of the new principle (such as was
attempted by Brett M.R. in Heaven v. Pender) is of
no use for direct application. The new principle neces­
sarily embodies its own concepts and thus involves the
need for further classification. The decision in Donoghue
v. Stevenson, for instance, contained many possibilities
of future distinctions-distinctions as to degree of prox­
imity or degree of control, distinctions between articles
for internal consumption and articles for external use,
between obvious and latent dangers, between personal
inj ury and mere pecuniary loss, and so on. All these lines
of thought may on occasion have to be explored by the
courts until new bases for classification are settled. And
so .he process goes on. One can think of other topics of
case-law, for instance, the history of restraints on trade
or the cases following upon Rylands v. Fletcher, to which
Professor Levi's analysis would seem equally apt. It cer­
tainly deserves extensive and thorough testing, for, if
sound, it opens the way to a new understanding of the
common law and its method.
Professor Levi's illustrations of the judicial process
applied to statutory interpretation (the Mann Act) and
constitutional interpretation (the "commerce clause") are
equally brilliant and suggestive. Here too the process is
in broad lines the same, but with differences. For in­
stance, a judge is not so free in dealing with a statute
or even with interpretative precedent as he is with pre-
(Continued on page 10)
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Law and Legal Education
Appropriately, the first of three conferences to honor
the Fiftieth Anniversary of the University of Chicago
Law School was on the subject "The Profession of Law
and Legal Education." Held on December 4, 1952, the
conference provided discussions of the numerous changes
which have taken place in the organization of the Bar
and legal education since the day when the first class
entered The Law School.
The morning session, presided over by Law School
Alumni Association President Glen A. Lloyd '23, dealt
with three types of legal practice under the general
heading "A Forward and Backward Glance at the Legal
Profession." Charles P. Curtis, of Choate, Hall and
Stewart of Boston, spoke on "The General Practitioner
and the Specialist." The Assistant General Counsel of the
Hercules Powder Company, Charles S. Maddock, re­
viewed "Present and Future Role of House Counsel," and
]. Carlisle Pryor '10, of Clark, Pryor, Hale, Plock and
Riley, Burlington, Iowa, discussed "The Small Law
Firm."
The University's Chancellor, Dr. Lawrence A. Kimp­
ton, presided at the luncheon session which was on the
topic "The Lawyer as a Community Leader." Robert
E. Mathews '20, Professor of Law, Ohio State University,
and president of the Association of American Law
Schools, spoke on "Legal Ethics and Responsible Lead­
ership." Mr. Mathews in his introductory remarks struck
an apt nostalgic note by claiming (and we are sure his
claim is just) that he was the only man present who at­
tended the cornerstone-laying ceremonies in 1902. As
a boy Professor Shailer Mathews' son watched the work­
men erect on the University quadrangles The Law
School he was graduated from eighteen years later. The
greetings of the American Bar Association were brought
to the conference by its president, R. B. Storey of Dallas,
Texas, who in a reversal of Professor Mathews' topic
(Contintted on page 13)
Dean Erwin N. Griswold, Sheldon TefJt, and T. Carlisle
Pryor
Left to right: Charles P. Curtis, T. Carlisle Pryor, Glen
A. Lloyd '23, and Charles S. Maddock.
Robert McDougal '29 with a group of students at the din­
ner session of the conference on "Th« Profession of Law
and Legal Education."
Robert E. Mathews '20, Chancellor Kimpton, R. B. Storey,
and Laird Bell '08
Left to right: Soia Mcntschikot], Aaron Director, and
Talcott Parsons
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Crosskcy on "Politics and the
Constitution' ,
For many years back, we of the Faculty have known we
had inevitably to face the question, whenever meeting
with alumni of recent years, "Has Professor Crosskey
completed his book?" And we have grown to expect the
smile of friendly doubt as to whether he would ever
finish, which has always followed our enforced answer:
"Not yet." Well, at last, this book, long eagerly awaited
"This remarkable work sweeps away acres of
nonsense that have been written about the Con­
stitution, and argues with an amplitude of evi­
dence that the framers of the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights believed they were setting up a
thoroughly national government, with the states
cast in a minor role. Professor Crosskey goes far
toward proving that the Federal Convention in­
tended to vest Congress with general (not enu­
merated) national legislative authority and to
confer upon the federal courts a unified national
administration of justice. He also shows how and
why the original meaning has become obscured
and distorted. His book should be in the hands
of all students of the Constitution, whether ju­
rists, lawyers, historians or poli.tical scientists. It
is perhaps the most fertile commentary on that
document since The Federalist papers of Madi­
son, Hamilton and Jay."
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, SR.
by Mr. Crosskey's students, friends, and colleagues, is
about to appear: it will be published by the University of
Chicago Press on April 17.
As those of us who have read it know, this book is not
just one more among the many poured out in a never
ending flood by writers and publishers; it is, instead, one
of those rare works whose. publication is an intellectual
event. Mr. Crosskey undertakes to prove that the Con­
stitution of the United States and much, especially of the
earlier part, of American constitutional history are mis­
understood; that the "real" Constitution, as it was con­
ceived by the Founding Fathers, has little similarity to
that described by the theories of the Supreme Court, un­
der which the country has long been operating.
According to Crosskey, it was the intention of the
Fathers-subject to all the limitations upon particular
matters that the Constitution contains-to set up a na­
tional government of general powers, legislative, execu­
tive, and judicial; in particular, it was their intention to
make clear that thi.s government would have power, not
only to regulate the commerce moving between territory
and territory of the several states, but to regulate all eco­
nomic activity among the people of the states; and to
establish a single supreme court for the country, with su­
premacy over all state courts in their administration of all
kinds of law, whether written or unwritten, or state or
national, in character. Only through a process of distor-
William W. Crosskey
tion, which set in at an early date, was the meaning of
the Constitution perverted to what Americans have come
to believe it means.
It all sounds incredible. Yet, when Professor Crosskey
undertakes to prove that such were, indeed, the historical
facts, he means proof in the sense of judicial proof, the
kind of proof that will stand up in a court of law, that
will be admitted to be presented to the jury, and that is
apt to convince them beyond a reasonable doubt. To be
sure, events which occurred a hundred-and-sixty-odd
years ago cannot easily be proved today with absolute
exactitude, in all cases; especially when they consist in the
thought-processes of men. But the evidence that exists
has been presented, and it is an impressive array, in
points overwhelming, not only by its sheer mass, but by
the sagacity with which it was discovered and the skill
with which it is presented.
Professor Crosskey has gone to the sources, all the
sources of which he could possibly think as likely to
throw light upon the ideas of the men of 1787 and the
product of their deliberations. Of course he has not found
everything; but I venture to think it will be a hard task,
indeed, to discover any letter, diary entry, newspaper
article, pamphlet, or other relevant record of the time
which, if still available, Mr. Crosskey has not unearthed,
analyzed, and evaluated, in its historical context, as it
bears upon his subject. No wonder, then, that it has taken
him so many years to complete these volumes.
Those of us who have known Bill Crosskey during the
last fifteen years know what an amount of work and
effort have gone into this work, how many wakeful
nights have been involved, how many hours of poring
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over the files of yellowed newspapers of bygone days, how
many trips to the libraries of the East, how many revi­
sions of text already drafted, and how many arguments
with friends and colleagues. We also witnessed the periods
of doubt and disgust, which, however, he always in the
end overcame through scholarly persistence.
Now the volumes are before us, and we can follow in
its completeness the argument and. the evidence.
The fact which is presented as standing out as the
principal cause of the transformation of the Constitution
is the nonuser for decades by the federal government of
those broad powers which were granted to it by the
Constitution. The radical change of the country's political
climate that occurred almost immediately after the estab­
lishment of the new government placed the constitutional
powers in the hands of men who not only did not wish to
use them but were vitally interested in making their use
impossible for the future. The driving force in trans­
forming the Confederation of the thirteen states into a na­
tion came, it will be remembered, from those who formed
themselves into the Federalist party after the new govern­
ment began to function. The principal strength of this
group had lain from the beginning in the northern states,
especially Massachusetts, where the powerful commercial
groups were interested in establishing one national gov­
ernment that could do away with the barriers by which
the several states had begun to impede internal trade and
which could act for the nation as a whole in its commer­
cial, financial, and political relationships with foreign
countries. It was by a fortunate coincidence that, for a
short, but decisive period, these northern interests hap­
pened to coincide with southern fears that the future de­
velopment of the western lands of the South might be
threatened by foreign powers, especially Spain, and that
no effective military defense against such threats would
be possible for the South alone. It was this temporary
coincidence of interests that produced the Constitution.
The ends of neither North nor South, as they were at
that time, would have been served by a federal govern­
ment so impotent as it was later made to appear by the
proponents of the theory of states rights.
This theory and the concomitant notion that the fed­
eral government, as established by the Constitution, was
one merely of a few enumerated powers was invented
when a shift in the economic and political situation
dampened the temporary southern fervor for a strong
national government. The outbreak of revolution in
France and the consequent successful slave rebellion in
the island of Haiti filled southern slaveowners with
alarming fears, not only for the economic bases of their
existence, but for the very lives of themselves and their
families. Simultaneously, the new prosperity which had
begun to succeed the depression of the post-Revolution
years, together with those rural resentments against urban
financiers to which the Jeffersonians appealed success­
fully, had come to weaken the influence of the commer­
cial groups of the North and the urgency of their de-
mands. Twelve years after the establishment of the new
government it was in the hands of those who were trying
to reduce its powers to the minimum level by construc­
tion; and it was kept in the hands of such men, almost
continuously, during the entire period up to the Civil
War. During that long period, whatever governing there
was, was done by the states; the powers of the nation un­
der the Constitution were not used.
And after 1812 the same group dominated the Supreme
Court. Marshall and Story were lone nationalists on a
Court overwhelmingly opposed to their ideas. Marshall
fought rear-guard actions, trying to preserve of the orig­
inal design of the Constitution as much as could be saved
for a possibly different future, for tactical reasons going
along with his colleagues of the Court's majority and
even writing opinions in support of their views. In this
view, he thus appears as anything but the bold innovator
by whose inventive genius originally narrow federal
powers were broadened at the expense of the states.
The total view of constitutional history, as it appears in
Mr. Crosskey's work, is even more startling. The picture
that arises from the immense body of American historiog­
raphy is that of a federal nation in which the powers
of the central government have been kept from the outset
within narrow limits, so narrow, indeed, that they had to
be broadened by creative and not always ingenious inter­
pretati.ons, in the period of the Marshall Court, and much
more so, in the period since the 1880's, when the scope of
governmental functions of the federal government was
continuously increased to the dramatic climax of the New
Deal and the Washington "centralizers" of the Fair
Deal. Every step in this process was contested in the
Supreme Court, which thus was thrust into the role of
the final arbiter in problems not so much of law as of
basic policy, and which sanctioned this steady expansion
either by resorting to sophistry or in treating the Consti­
tution as a "living document," the choice of the term
depending upon the observer's own leanings. In the view
of American history that Mr. Crosskey takes, this tradi­
tional view is wrong. Conceived at the outset as a grant
of all powers necessary for the vigorous government of a
unified nation, the Constitution was by sophistry nar­
rowed down to a mere shadow of its original self; and so
successful was this process that the knowledge of the
Constitution's original and true meaning was lost com­
pletely; and when the need for national governmental
action became imperative after the Civil War, the bases
for it could barely be found in the Constitution. It thus
had to be squeezed and stretched in the most artificial
ways to produce that ill-fitting patchwork of powers
where intricacies have so often stood in the way of effec­
tive governmental action, which has resulted in so many
baffling uncertainties, hardships, and injustices, and which
would all be unnecessary if the Constitution were only
understood in its original meaning. Most of our tradi­
tional constitutional law has accordingly been wrong,
(Continued on page 14)
FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY DINNER
Laird Bell '07, Judge Learned Hand, and Chancellor
Kimpton following the Convocation on December 19, at
which Judge Hand received an honorary degree. The de­
gree citation read: "An able lawyer, a distinguished judge,
and a worthy citizen who, with great learning, skill, and
integrity, has worked in the finest tradition to perfect
our basic institutions of freedom under law."
Toastmaster Dwight P. Green '12 welcomes Judge Hand
to the speakers' table.
A record crowd of Law School alumni gathered on December 19 for the Fiftieth Anniversary Dinner. Judge Learned
Hand, Chancellor Kimpton, and Dean Levi addressed the meeting at which Dwight P. Green, '12, served as toast­
master.
The faculty joined Judge Hand and Chancellor Kimpton at the speaker's table. Present were emeriti Frederic Wood­
ward and George G. Bogert.
James Evans '48 (left), and Fred C. Ash '40, a hard-work­
ing committee of two, deserve a vote of thanks for their
smooth planning.
Albert L. Hopkins '08 seen chatting with Judge Hand
before the Fiftieth Anniversary Dinner.
Whatever it is that Judge Hand is telling Professor Karl
Llewellyn seems to amuse Mrs. Llewellyn, Professorial
Lecturer Soia Mentschikof],
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Federal Tax Conference
We failed, in the Autumn Quarter issue of THE RECORD,
to report on the fifth annual Federal Tax Conference held
in October under the auspi.ces of The Law School, the
School of Business, and University College. Alumni
readers of Taxes magazine will have seen the December
The Fifth Federal Tax Conference in session
issue which reported the proceedings and printed a num­
ber of the papers given at the conference. But we want to
tell the alumni generally about this fifth and largest (thus
far) conference on federal taxation.
The topics ranged from "Shifting Income within the
Family Group" to "Practical Legal Aspects of Tax Ac­
counting," and fifteen different subjects filled the three
days of meetings. The Planning Committee under the
chairmanship of Robert R. Jorgensen of Sears, Roebuck
and Company included The Law School's Walter J.
Blum, William M. Emery of McDermott, Will and
Emery, William N. Hahhad of Bell, Boyd, Marshall and
Lloyd, James D. Head of Winston, Strawn, Black and
Towner, William A. McSwain of Eckhart, Klein, Mc-
Left to right: Walter [, Blum, Robert N. Miller, and
Randolph Paul, with participants at the Fifth Annual
Federal Tax Conference.
Swain and Campbell, Michael J. Sporer of Arthur Ander­
sen and Company, Harry B. Sutter of Hopkins, Sutter,
Halls, DeWolfe and Owen, and the School of Business'
Royal S. Van de Woestyne.
Highlights of the Conference were Randolph Paul's
discussion of "Directions in Which Tax Policy and Law
Have Been Moving," an appraisal of "The Reorganiza­
tion of the Bureau of Internal Revenue" by Robert N.
Miller, and Leo A. Diamond's analysis of "Gifts to
Minors."
Book Reviews (Continued [rom page 4)
cedents in the realm of case-law, because all the words
of a statute are operative and none can be treated as mere
dictum; nevertheless they nearly always admit differ­
ences of interpretation. A written Constitution such as
that of the United States, however, increases the freedom
of the courts in as much as it opens the possibility of
appealing from precedent or statute to the higher law
of the Constitution, and a written Constitution, express­
ing in broad language the ideals of its age, "must be
enormously ambiguous in its general provisions."
Such in the author's view is the true nature of legal
reasoning and such are the lines on which it should be
studied. Obviously its results in any single case must be
uncertain and hard to predict; we may have been rescued
from the utter confusion into which other realists seemed
to have plunged us but we have no hope of regaining
our old comfortable faith in law as an exact science
satisfying the ordinary man's desire for certainty in the
conduct of his affairs. Why then do we accept the law
and bow to its compulsion? Professor Levi does not
leave this question unanswered. In the first place, even
if we cannot predict the choice which a court will in a
particular case make between competing analogies, legal
procedure "protects the parties and the community by
making sure that the competing analogies are before
the court ... in this sense the parties as well as the court
participate in the law making. In this sense, also, lawyers
represent more than the litigants." In the second place,
much of the law is at any moment reasonably certain. It
is only the area of doubt that calls for the intervention
of the court and "the area of doubt is constantly set
forth. The probable area of expansion or contraction is
foreshadowed as the system works. This is the only kind
of system which will work when people do not agree
completely."
The publishers are not wrong when they say in their
note that "this volume will be of interest and value to
students of logic, ethics and political philosophy, as well
as to members of the legal profession and to everyone
concerned with problems of government and j urispru­
dence." Few volumes of such small bulk contain so much
matter for thought.
A. H. CAMPBELL
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National Moot-Court Competition
This year The Law School team won second-place hon­
ors in the third annual National Inter-Law School Moot­
Court Competition. Sponsored by the Committee on
Junior Bar Activities of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, the competition was extended to
sixty-two law schools, with fifteen schools participating in
the final rounds and the winning place going to George­
town University Law School.
The Chicago participants were Jean Allard of Tren­
ton, Missouri; George B. Beall, of Dallas, Texas; and
Chicago's 1952 Moot-Court Team (left to right): Paul
Wenger, Jr., West Hartford, Connecticut; George Beale,
Dallas, Texas; and Jean Allard, Trenton, Missouri, being
congratulated by Mr. Justice Reed.
Paul N. Wenger, Jr., of West Hartford, Connecticut. The
issue before the Moot Supreme Court was the validity of
a state law prohibiting aliens ineligible to become citizens
from owning land within the state. Chicago, defending
the validity of the law, defeated Western Reserve in the
preliminary round, the University of Arizona in the sec­
ond round, and Vanderbilt in the semifinals.
Judges in the final round were: Mr. Justice Stanley F.
(Continued on page 12)
Jean Allard at the National Inter-Law School Moot­
Court Competition
Alumni News
JOHN A. JOHNSON, JD '40, is now general counsel to the
Department of the Air Force. Mr. Johnson came to the
Law School from De Pauw University, where he received
his A.B. An Alpha Delt while at Chicago, he also was
a member of the Law School Bar Association and the
.
Barristers Club. Upon gradua-
tion he joined the legal depart­
ment of the Burlington Railroad.
He subsequently was in the Di­
vision of Internal Security Affairs
of the Department of State. His
wife, the former Harriet Nelson,
received her A.B. from the Uni­
versity in 1939.
The West Publishing Com­
pany has recently issued Federal
John A. Johnson '40 Administrative Law by URBAN
A. LAVERY, '10. The former man­
aging editor of the American Bar Association Journal has
compiled a reference study covering the Administrative
Procedure Act of 1946, an evalua­
tion and appraisal of the major
agencies in the federal govern­
ment and a critique of adminis­
trative rule making.
PATRICK DONOVAN, who was a
Bigelow Fellow in 1949-50, has
been appointed Professor of Com­
mercial Law at Melbourne, Aus­
tralia.
The Ekco Foundation, headed
by BENJAMIN A. RAGIR '36 of Urban A. Lavery '10
Ekco Products Company, has es-
The annual meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools, which was held this year in Chicago, provided
the occasion of a reunion for alumni with their colleagues
in The Law School Faculty. Chicagoan Robert E.
Mathews '20, Professor of Law at Ohio State University,
was president of the Association last year and presided
at the sessions.
(Continued on page 13)
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New Faces of 1953
Five new appointments of The University of Chicago
Law School were announced in January by Dean Edward
H. Levi.
Leading the list is Brainerd
Currie, Dean of the University of
Pittsburgh Law School. A visit­
ing professor at The Law School
during the past summer, Mr.
Currie is an authority in the field
of conflict of laws. He received
his Bachelor's degree and Bache­
lor of Laws degree from Mercer
University and a Master of Laws
degree from Columbia in 1941.
Brainerd Currie He was admitted to practice in
Georgia in 1935 and practiced
with the firm of Park and Strozier in Macon. From 1946
to 1949 he was Associate Professor of Law at Duke Uni­
versity and from 1949 to 1952 Professor of Law at the
University of California at Los
Angeles. A former editor of Law
and Contemporary Problems and
editor-in-chief of the Journal of
Legal Education, Mr. Currie will
join our faculty in the Summer
Quarter, 1953.
Philip Kurland, who presently
holds the rank of Associate Pro­
fessor of Law at Northwestern
University Law School, also will
join the Chicago Faculty this Philip Kurland
summer. A law clerk to Judge
Jerome Frank in 1944-45 and to Justice Felix Frankfurter
in 1945-46, Kurland practiced in New York City from
1947 to 1950. An authority in the fields of procedure and
federal jurisdiction, Kurland
taught at the University of Indi­
ana Law School before joining
the Northwestern faculty.
Hans Zeisel, whose appoint­
ment as Professor of Law and
Sociology became effective on
January 1, was formerly director
of research for the Tea Bureau,
Inc. A co-founder of the Institute
of Psychological Market Re-
Hans Zeisel search at the University of Vien-
na, Zeisel received his law degree
from the University of Vienna and practiced law in
Vienna until 1937. Since coming to the United States he
has taught economi.cs and statistics at Rutgers University
and Columbia University, served as a chief consultant to
the United States War Department, and held the posi­
tions of chairman on the Committee on Research Tech­
niques of the American Marketing Association and vice-
president of the Market Research
Council of New York.
Two assistant deans have been
added to the Law School. Mr. Jo
Desha Lucas came to the Law
School this year as a Bigelow
Teaching Fellow. He was ad­
mitted to the Virginia Bar last
year after receiving his Master's
degree in law at Columbia Uni­
versity Law School. A graduate
of Syracuse University, he also
holds a Master of Public Admin­
istration degree from the Maxwell Graduate School, Syra­
cuse University. Mr. Lucas has
been appointed Assistant Profes­
sor of Law and Assistant Dean,
replacing Mr. Sims Carter as
Dean of Students.
Mr. James M. Ratcliffe, who
is now Assistant Dean and Direc­
tor of Placement, holds two de­
grees from the University of Chi­
cago. He received his A.B. from
the College in 1946 and his J.D.
from the Law School in 1950, in James Ratcliffe
which year he was admitted to
the Illinois Bar. In addition to his responsibilities in the
Placement Office, he will work with the Alumni Asso-
Jo Desha Lucas
ciation in its programs.
Moot Court (Continued from page 11)
Reed; The Honorable John J. Parker, Chief Judge, u.S.
Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit; The Honorable Leslie
Knox Munro, Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary for New Zealand; The Honorable Stan­
ley H. Fuld, Judge of the Court of Appeals of the State
of New York; The Honorable David W. Peck, Presiding
Justice, Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, New
York; and The Honorable Bethuel M. Webster, Presi­
dent, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
The Chicago contestants, as runners-up, were individ­
ually presented with copies of Restatement of the Law;
and for presenting the best brief in the competition the
Chicago team got a year's subscription to Shepards for
Illinois. Jean Allard, for presenting the second-best oral
argument, was presented with a copy of Uniform Laws
Annotated.
The Chicago team was the guest at lunch of White
and Case, and Si.dney Davis '42 gave the near-winners a
consolation luncheon on the day after.
Openings in your firm?-The Placement Office is ready
to help you; get in touch with Mr. James Ratcliffe.
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tablished a scholarship at The
Law School for an initial period
of three years. The Ekco Foun­
dation Scholarship will be award­
ed annually in the amount of
$1,000 to an outstanding student.
Word has been received that
VICTOR H. KULP '08, after a long
and distinguished teaching ca­
reer, has retired from the Univer­
sity of Oklahoma.
Through the efforts of ARNOLD Arnold I. Shure '29
1. SHURE an additional full-tui-
tion scholarship has been made available to The Law
School from the scholarship funds of Phi Sigma Delta
Left to right: MyresMcDougal, Professor of Law at Yale;
Edmund O. Belsheim J.S.D. '31, Dean of the Law School,
University of Nebraska; and Wilber G. Katz, James
ParkerHall Professor of Law at the Association meetings.
fraternity. In the two preceding years the fraternity has
provided scholarships for law students.
STEVEN OSUSKY '15, for many years Czech Ambassador
to France and now Chairman of the Free Czechoslova­
kian Government, renewed old acquaintances on a recent
visit to Chicago. His arrival fell on the day of Chancellor
Kimpton's luncheon for The Law School Fund Advisory
Committee, and Morris E. Feiwell '15, Chicago Fund
Chairman, welcomed him to the meeting. Osusky
brought his fellow-alumni a stirring account of the con­
tinuing fight for freedom on both sides of the Iron Cur­
tain.
Jeff Davis and Allen parishes in Louisiana have the
youngest district attorney in their history in BERNARD
MARCANTEL '48. The new twenty-nine-year-old D.A. of
Jennings, Louisiana, took his LL.B. at Tulane and his
J.D. at Chicago.
Left to right: Emeritus Professor George G. Bogert;
Professor Ernst W. Puttleammer; (standing) Victor H.
Kulp '08, David Ross Boyd Professor Emeritus at the
University of Oklahoma Law School; and A. L. Jensen,
Professor of Law at the University of Utah, photo­
graphed at the reunion luncheon during the meetings of
the Association of American Law Schools.
Law and Legal Education (Continued [rom page 5)
spoke on "Responsible Leadership and Legal Skills."
Soia Mentschikoff, Chicago's first distaff side law pro­
fessor, presided at the afternoon session on "How Others
See the Profession." Talcott Parsons, Professor of Sociol­
ogy at Harvard University, spoke on "A Sociologist
Views the Legal Profession." The bench was represented
with "A Trial Judge Views the Profession" with the
remarks of The Honorable John P. Barnes, District
Judge, United States District Court of the Northern Dis­
trict of Illinois. This multifaceted view of the legal pro­
fession was concluded with the paper "A Legal Historian
Views the Growth of the Profession in the United States"
by Professor James W. Hurst of the University of Wis­
consin.
Dean Edward H. Levi presided at the after-dinner and
concluding session of the all-day conference. It was a
dean's evening. F. Champion Ward, Dean of the College
of The University of Chicago discussed "The Liberal Arts
and Legal Education," and Brainerd Currie, Dean of the
School of Law, University of Pittsburgh (who joins our
faculty next fall), spoke on "The Place of Law in the
Liberal Arts College." The final speaker of the day was
Erwin N. Griswold, Dean of the Law School of Harvard
University, who presented a summation and forecast on
"The Future of Legal Education."
The proceedings of the first Fiftieth Anniversary C011-
ference will be published shortly by The Law School.
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Crosshcy (Continued from page 7)
and our traditional historiography mistaken, because both
have unquestioningly accepted the falsification of the
meaning of the Constitution which was brought about by
the Jeffersonians for political ends and was gradually
foisted onto the country as correct by them and their
states-rights successors in the period before the Civil War.
These startling theses are sought to be proved by Pro­
fessor Crosskey along two lines: a study of the Constitu­
tion as a meaningful document, and a study of the facts of
American constitutional history. What, he asks, were the
real issues, demands, and aspirations at the time of the
Revolution? What were the problems developed during
the period of Confederation? What did actually occur at
the Federal Convention? What were the issues and the
tactics of the struggle for ratification? What happened in
the political sphere in the early years of government un­
der the Constitution? How did the enemies of unified
government produce their new theories about the mean­
ing of the Constitution and by what means did they suc­
ceed in substituting them for the original meaning in
the public mind so as finally to establish them as the
unquestionably accepted meaning?
These broad questions are not fully discussed in the
two volumes now before us. The full discussion has been
reserved for future parts of the work, of which no more
than a tempting foretaste is given now. In these future
parts Professor Crosskey will also show the decisive role
played in the falsification of the historical picture by
James Madison, whose notes on the Federal Convention
have generally been accepted as an absolutely accurate
report of the proceedings with which they deal. Published
more than fifty years after the event and nearly as long
after Madison's transformation from an ardent Federalist
into a leading states-rights protagonist, these notes should
have been treated with suspicion, as, indeed, they were
when they first appeared. Professor Crosskey hints at
evidence unearthed by him that indicates that such sus­
picions were not unwarranted.
But, as indicated, all this is for the future. In the two
volumes before us now, Mr. Crosskey pursues his other
line of proof, which is basically that of the lawyer, rather
than the historian, although the latter's tools are consis­
tently employed in the performance of the former's tasks.
The Constitution is a legal document. So, let us read it
as lawyers, but-and this is Mr. Crosskey's new propo­
sal-not with the mind of a lawyer of the twentieth cen­
tury or the late nineteenth century, but with the mind of
an American lawyer of the late eighteenth century when
the document was drawn. That suggestion, it turns out,
cannot be followed easily. The ways of legal thought of
the contemporaries of Blackstone and Mansfield were
not precisely those of today. Their methods of draftsman­
ship were different; the political and legal universe within
which they lived, strove, worked, and wrote was theirs,
not ours. They had problems to solve the very existence of
which has been forgotten; they could take many things
for granted which we cannot, and much appeared to them
problematical which we take for settled. Besides, and this
turns out to be of special significance, their use of lan­
guage was different from ours. Of course, they thought,
discussed, and wrote in English, but it was the English
of the 1780's rather than that of later times, and that
English had its own usages, in structure as well as in
vocabulary. Most of the words of their vocabulary still
belong to ours, and mostly they have preserved the same
connotations of meaning; but not entirely. There have
been shifts, first in nuances, then in a more massive way,
but occurring so slowly, so imperceptibly, that they have
escaped complete discovery, even by lexicographers, who,
with all their meticulous effort, have been unable to
record and articulate all the shifts of all the meanings of
all the words of the language. Furthermore, basic ideas
have shifted in the legal realm; for example, as to the
status, makeup, and concrete content of the Common
Law; and since Mr. Crosskey shows that the framers
regarded the Common Law as being the standing nation­
allaw, these shifts in legalideas have an important bear­
ing on what the Constitution means.
The systematic investigation of the eighteenth-century
legal world and of the vocabulary of the American Con­
stitution makers of that time is an essential element in
the present part of Mr. Crosskey's work, and, when
read against the background of the old forgotten legal
ideas and with an eighteenth-century vocabulary, the
Constitution emerges as a new document, simple, plain,
and consistent in all its parts, the carefully considered
and well-formulated work of men who cannot have
meant anything other than to establish the government
of a nation endowed with all the powers necessary for
effective government; for, when the document is so read,
it cannot be denied that the framers did succeed in ex­
pressing their scheme in clear language, plainly under­
standable to everyone who cares to read it in their way
rather than in that of later times.
In his endeavor to read the Constitution in the light of
eighteenth-century usage, Mr. Crosskey starts with the
Commerce Clause; with the power of Congress to "regu­
late Commerce among the several States." It is taken as
axiomatic today that these words refer to what has come
to be known, more generally, as "interstate commerce";
i.e., activities which involve the movement of goods, per­
sons, or intelligence from a point in one state to a point in
another. If the clause were literally applied with that
meaning, much present-day legislation would be consti­
tutional only within a most narrowly limited field, if at
all. To maintain the constitutionality of the federal anti­
trust laws, labor laws, social security legislation, agricul­
tural marketing laws, etc., it has therefore been necessary
to stretch the supposed constitutional grant of power so as
to extend to activities apt to "affect interstate commerce,"
and then to stretch this new concept to its utmost limits,
although the text of the Constitution, when read in the
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traditional way, contains nothing which would seem to
allow of even the first step in this stretching. But, strange­
ly, there is no evidence that this usual reading was that
of the framers or the early expounders of the Constitu­
tion. That to them the phrase must have conveyed a dif­
ferent meaning becomes clear when the late-eighteenth­
century usage of the three keywords, "Commerce," "reg­
ulate," and "States," is investigated. Mr. Crosskey finds
that "Commerce" meant not only buying and selling
goods and transportation but all gainful activity of every
kind. The verb "regulate" was synonymous with "gov­
ern." So, "to regulate commerce" simply meant to take
all possible governmental measures in the economic
sphere. And, as for "among the States," the key to its
meaning is that "State," to the eighteenth-century mind,
was a "noun of multitude," meaning "the people" who
made up the "state"; a noun, in other words, comparable
to "tribes" and "nations." And a power "to regulate
Commerce among the several States" of America is
therefore like a power "to regulate marriage among the
several tribes" of some Indian nation. Would anyone un­
derstand such a power as limited to the regulation of in­
tertribal marriages? Hardly; the natural meaning would
be power to regulate marriage as to all those persons who
belong to the Indian tribes. In just the same sense "com­
merce among the several States" meant, to the man of the
eighteenth century, commerce carried on among the
people of our American states, all these people, wherever
they might be with relation to state lines. "The power to
regulate Commerce among the several States" is, then, the
power to regulate the internal economic life of the nation,
just as the power to regulate commerce with foreign na­
tions is that of governing the nation in its economic rela­
tionships with the world outside, and both together, in
conjunction with that referring to the commerce with the
Indian tribes, constitute the fulness of governmental
power to deal with the economic life of the nation, in­
ternally and externally. The need for a government hav­
ing just such power is then shown, by Mr. Crosskey, to
have been emphasized by the men who paved the way
for the Federal Convention, who composed the document
in it, and who hailed it after its adoption, just as it was
the butt of those who, early thereafter, began to attack
the Constitution as having gone too far for their tastes.
For all these propositions Professor Crosskey adduces
ample and convincing evidence. But, still, there remains a
source of doubt. If, by the commerce clause, the federal
government was given the fulness of power in the eco­
nomic field, why is it then followed by that catalogue of
special economic powers which we find in Section 8 of
the First Article of the Constitution: the powers to coin
money, regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin,
and fix the standard of weights and measures; or the
power to establish post offices and post roads, etc? This
seeming contradiction is explained when we consider two
facts: first, that it was no unusual thing for an eight­
eenth-century draftsman, in a contract, will, statute, ordi-
nance, or other legal document, first to lay down a broad,
general rule, and then to state those of its specific applica­
tions for which there existed some particular reason that
they be spelled out explicitly. Mr. Crosskey shows a
single, common, particular reason did, in fact, exist for
the enumeration in Article 1, Section 8, of more than half
the specific commercial and other governmental powers
there enumerated: they were enumerated to make sure
that they belonged to Congress rather than the President.
In eighteenth-century England the powers in question
had either been recognized as belonging to the Executive,
or had been the subject of controversy between king and
Parliament. The history of these powers and controversies
is traced by Mr. Crosskey with meticulous care, just as he
points out the reasons why it was necessary for the
Fathers of the Constitution of the United States to state
expressly that they were to belong to Congress, it Con­
gress was to have them rather than the President. As for
the other specifically enumerated powers of Congress, Mr.
Crosskey shows the miscellaneous motives that led to the
specific mention of all of these, and that these motives
had nothing to do with securing power against the states.
Nothing in the text of Section 8, Article I, indicates that
it was ever intended to draw the line between the powers
of the federal government and those of the states. The
clause says that: "The Congress" shall have certain pow­
ers, i.e., those which it specifically enumerates, and, then,
in its final clause, also the power "to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution
... all other powers vested by this Constitution in the
government of the United States, or in any department or
officer thereof." This is a plain reference to powers, be it
noted, that are vested by the Constitution, not in some
special department or officer of the United States, but in
the government as such. Where in the Constitution are
there any such powers? There are powers vested in the
President, the Senate, the Congress, or the judiciary, but
where are there any powers vested in the government as
such? So what is the meaning of this reference to the
"other Powers" of "the Government," in Section 8 of
Article I?
Orthodox constitutional interpretation has no answer
to this question. It has consistently ignored this reference
to the "other" powers vested in the government of the
United States. But, are we allowed to ignore words in an
instrument which, as Mr. Crosskey proves, was drafted
with great care by experienced draftsmen? Certainly not
unless no reference for these words can be found any­
where in the instrument. But such reference can be
found; to wit, in the Preamble, which to an eighteenth­
century lawyer meant more than a mere statement of
policies devoid of direct legal significance. In an eight­
eenth-century statute, treaty, or ordinance the preamble
was an essential part, often the most essential, not in the
sense of simply guiding the judge in his interpretation
and, even less, in any-at that time-unknown scrutiny
of constitutionality, but as the expression of those basic
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general principles which, stated bindingly in the most
conspicuous place, were to be spelled out as to detail,
where necessary, in the following parts of the instrument.
When scrutinized in this light, it appears that the Pre­
amble to the Constitution is a most carefully phrased
statement of the purposes of government, as they had
been analyzed by the writers of the age and which, when
brought together, as they were in the Preamble, would
refer to the fulness of powers of sovereign government.
Still, the doubter may ask, what about the Tenth
Amendment? If the Constitution itself has failed with
sufficient clarity to state that the federal government was
to be one of enumerated powers, has that thought not
found expression in the Amendment? Again we are ad­
monished by Mr. Crosskey to read it, not with the mind
of a citizen of the twentieth century, but with the mind
of a contemporary of the men of 1789, and again it ap­
pears that the text does, not only not militate against, but
strongly supports, Mr. Crosskey's reading of the Consti­
tution.
And so, taking up one part of the instrument after the
other, the author demonstrates, with infinite care, pains,
and patience, that they all make sense and fit together to
make up a plain, simple, and efficient governmental
scheme, in which the states were not to be obliterated but
were to continue to function and to occupy an important
role in the governmental structure of the country, but a
scheme, nevertheless, under which this country was to be
a nation, one and indivisible, and in which the national
government was to be able to act in reference to all mat­
ters for which uniform regulation and uniform action
should at any time be deemed advisable or necessary.
That so shortly after the adoption of the Constitution a
political constellation was to arise which would render
the exercise of these powers impossible could not be fore­
seen by its makers. Still less could they foresee that the
meaning of their work was to be intentionally distorted
by some of those who were in their very midst, and least
of all could they foresee that the latter's efforts would be
successfully carried on for a period long enough to allow
the original meaning of the Constitution to be forgotten
and to disappear behind the imperceptibly changed fa­
cade of new word meanings and new basic conceptions
about the common law. For those doubters who find it
hard to believe in the fact of actual, intentional distor­
tion of the Constitution, Mr. Crosskey produces irrefuta­
ble evidence; for example, with respect to the two ex­
post-facto clauses of the Constitution.
For some of his background material we have to wait
for the future parts of Mr. Crosskey's work. But what he
has presented in the two volumes of Politics and the Con­
stitution in the History of the United States is impressive
enough.
That the book will be attacked is certain. Its theses are
too startling not to provoke resistance on the part of his­
torians as well as on that of the practitioners of constitu­
tionallaw. For the historians it will not be easy to refute
Mr. Crosskey's charge of uncritical and thus unscholarly
acceptance, as historical truth, of a partisan view skilfully
propagated under circumstances favorable to its adoption
almost beyond belief.
For the constitutional life of the nation, the adoption of
Professor Crosskey's reading of the basic text would mean
that we shake off as unnecessary ballast those tortured
theories which constitutional lawyers found themselves
compelled to invent if government was to fulfil elemen­
tary twentieth-century needs. There would also disappear
those doctrines which have so often and so effectively
been used by sectional groups to maintain the sacrosanc­
tity of their tenets arid interests. Certainly those interests
which are still felt with vigor would find the means for
effective defense under any constitutional scheme. Yet, stiff
resistance must be expected against the acceptance of Mr.
Crosskey's thesis even as historically true. Assuming they
were to be accepted as such, it might still be a long way
toward their full actualization in constitutional life. A cen­
tury and a half of error produce the normative effect of
the factual. Yet, the meaning which the Founding Fathers
meant to express in their work cannot be brushed aside en­
tirely. It will serve as a powerful weapon in political argu­
ment, it will be resorted to in dissenting opinions of the
Supreme Court, and it is bound to find, though probably,
at first, only in scattered instances, expression in decisions
of the Court. The readiness of the Court to resort to histor­
ical research in its interpretation of the Constitution and
early federal legislation has been demonstrated by the use
the Court made of Charles Warren's investigation into
the meaning of the thirty-fourth section of the first Judici­
ary Act. Perhaps it might be induced to revise that deci­
sion under the impact of Professor Crosskey's convincing
demonstration of the incompleteness and, consequently,
the misleading nature of Warren's argument. Perhaps, the
Court will be induced to revise, or discard, that concept of
interstate commerce which, since it became stereotyped
and accepted, has resulted in so many unnecessary diffi­
culties, as our author shows. Perhaps, the Court will re­
vise its strange definition of the scope of maritime law
which has resulted in so much hardship to injured work­
ers and to employers. Perhaps, the impact of that redis­
covered original meaning of the Constitution will bring
about changes which cannot yet be foreseen. The book
contains dynamite. It will be attacked, the truth of its
historical conclusio'ns will be doubted by many, one or
the other detail may perhaps be disproved, but neglected
it cannot be. Lawyers will use it in argument, judges will
have to discuss it, historians will have to test it, politicians
will draw upon or inveigh against it, and many will read
it for the sheer joy of reliving that decisive period of his­
tory which has been so colorfully, readably, and thrilling­
ly re-created in this book.
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